Full transcript
SPEAKER_02 0:00
It’s Monday morning in an office. A team shares documents using their cloud storage service. They take video calls and flip between apps to chat about an upcoming project. They use another service to track their launches and another for the webinars they record and share. Something that might surprise you? Cyber criminal groups are no different. Okay, their software looks different, their applications being put to different uses, but more and more often they’re subscribing to services that give them new abilities outside their expertise. They’re gaining access to ransomware, malware, messaging APIs, and phishing capabilities. For a fee, wannabe criminals can purchase software to perform criminal acts, then split the fee with its developers. One such service allows its customers to bypass the multi-factor authentication, protecting users all over the world. And when criminals want to hack into organizations, almost nine in ten of them come directly to this platform. And it’s codenamed Tycoon 2FA. Today, Craig and I are joined by a returning guest. Jeff White is an investigative journalist, author, and podcaster whose work focuses on the intersection between organized crime and technology, with a particular interest in financial crime and money laundering. You may recognize him from his book, Rinced, or his recent podcast, The Conti Files, or perhaps from our Lazarus episode in season one. Jeff, great to have you back.
SPEAKER_03 1:32
Great to be back. Thanks for having me.
SPEAKER_02 1:34
Craig, what is Tycoon 2FA and what service does it provide to cyber criminals?
SPEAKER_00 1:39
Yeah, great to be back, Gary. And uh hi Jeff, good to see you again. It’s uh been a little while. Um so Tycoon 2FA is an advisory in the middle phishing as a service platform, uh, first discovered in late 2023. And what that does, it provides cyber criminals with turnkey infrastructure. And what this means is they can intercept credentials, bypass multi-factor authentication in real time, and it sort of operates as a reverse proxy position between the victims and legitimate login services, mainly Microsoft 365 and Google Workplace. Now, this is quite interesting because this is quite sophisticated in one way, and I don’t want to use the word sophisticated, so I do apologise there. But effectively, they’re leveraging that technology, and actually they’ve got quite a clear market for that because it is quite difficult for cyber criminals sometimes to come in that don’t have that technical knowledge, and they’re able to provide that for them effectively. So they’re they’re they’re offering quite a quite a high-level cybercrime entry for criminals or other groups to commit cybercrime.
SPEAKER_02 2:49
Jeff, can you see why this is of value to cyber criminals at large?
SPEAKER_03 2:53
Oh, absolutely, yeah. I mean, yes, it’s 2026 and we’re all talking about AI and so on, but frankly, phishing is still the weapon of choice for a lot of hacking gangs and because it’s still effective. Um and what was fascinating about the Tycoon 2FA example, which I’d seen the headlines of, but hadn’t really dug into a lot ahead of this podcast until I started looking into it, is frankly creating phishing pages that look a bit like the Microsoft or Google Workspace page, it was it was effective, it was good, but it didn’t sort of blow my socks off. What I thought was fascinating was this gang had worked out that when you log into Microsoft or Google, you have the the two-factor authentication, you know, message to your phone or something like that. But what they then did was threw up a screen in front of the victim to say, right, now enter that token or enter those numbers or whatever. Now, again, that may not sound very advanced, but what I thought was interesting was they’ve got to be absolutely sure that that screen is reflecting what the victim is receiving. Is it a four-digit code? Is it a six-digit code? What does it look like? Is it letters and numbers? What service is providing it? So it’s almost like Tycoon 2FA were sort of shadowing their targets, like right, what does Microsoft use? What does Google use? We need to do the same thing. And obviously, this changes companies change providers, you know, all the time. So they had to sort of keep abreast of that. That’s what I thought was really impressive about this, for want of a better word.
SPEAKER_00 4:12
But I think, Jeff, you’re right, it it’s the business ability and the accurate to carry on doing the RD, you know, making sure they stay up to date with the latest screens, almost like the latest products. So when people are coming on, you know, it all looks real to them. You know, what’s not to understand? It just looks like it. It’s asked me the right questions. I’ve got the information yet, I’m just going to bang it in there, basically.
SPEAKER_02 4:33
Who’s buying this, Craig? Who’s the customers?
SPEAKER_00 4:35
So, I mean, this this could be anybody, so it’s right across the criminal infrastructure. You can have those sort of initial access brokers that they want to specialise in breaching those enterprises and their accounts. So they need valid credentials um or active sessions, and this then allows those ransomware cartels to come into play here. But also, you know, you look at these sort of corporate espionage groups as well. As Jeff said, Ben, this is even more compromised. That’s a huge market. And when when you look at the volume and scale of this, and and you leverage that into AI, and I’ve said AI for the first time today, so I apologize. But you look at that volume side now, it is phenomenal. Um, you know, these scammers are looking to leveragize, left leverage those CEO accounts to the frauds um and use that technical expertise that they then have or fake invoices as well. Then you’ve got those lower skill people who call them script kiddies or whatever, but that comes back to this is turnkey infrastructure. So you know, you don’t really need to understand how it all works, but it does. And it allows them to build that into their own business model, and that is a criminal business model as well. And then you’ve got those affiliated base cybercrime syndicates. So these are these organized crime groups running high-volume um fishing runs against enterprise workforces. So that’s that volume side where they can go backwards and forwards very, very quickly.
SPEAKER_03 5:59
Just to chime in on that quickly, um, what I found fascinating about this was one of the reports that looked at Tycoon 2FA talked about business email compromise attacks. And Craig’s talked about it there. This is fraud. I mean, they message the finance department and say, look, we’re your stationary suppliers. You usually pay us into this bank account. We change bank accounts, please pay us into this new bank account. And so the victim changes the account, makes a payment, and then two weeks later, the real stationary supplier starts asking, Well, why haven’t you paid us? And the victim says, Well, we did pay you into your new bank account. And the stationary supplier says, No, we don’t have a new bank account. Of course, two weeks has gone by the time that’s sort of spotted. I always wondered with those attacks, yeah, fine, you you can kind of understand how that works, but you’ve got to sort of know, well, who is the stationary supplier and who’s the name of the person there who runs the account? All that information, I always thought, well, how do the Fords just have that? And of course, Tycoon 2FA gives you the answer to that. You know, they’re using this to break in, not just to, you know, as Craig said, plant ransomware or whatever, but to get the insights that you need in order to carry out that kind of fraud. It’s sort of where fraud and cyber both meet. And we really need to pay attention to that, because that’s they tend to be on different sides of the fence, or fraud’s over here, cyber’s over there. What the Tycoon 2FA example shows you is they’re really close together. You know, there’s a lot of crossover.
SPEAKER_00 7:16
And I think Kiff, that that’s part of that whole ecosystem, isn’t it? That’s around, you know, we have these um mass data thefts from companies. Well, why is that important? Actually, the criminals will then go through all that information from a company. They look to see who their customers are, they look to see who their suppliers are, they look to see what passwords are there, they’ll look even to see well, what cyber insurance do they have, you know. So they will use all the evidence, or I say evidence, sorry, all that intelligence or business intelligence, and that helps them build out that that criminal model. And then they can sell that off to different groups, they can use it to expand their their own sort of financial gain by committing cybercrime as well. So it’s a very much a self-feeding model. I think Jeff’s point there, we always get hung about, oh, that’s fraud, you’ve got to deal with this from the law enforcement side, or that’s cybercrime, you’ve got to deal with cyber dependent or cyber-enabled cybercrime. What we often forget about is who are the victims behind this and what is the impact on the victims. And the higher the harm is more about the priority than that law enforcement, but also the private sector should be putting into those sorts of crimes as well.
SPEAKER_02 8:20
What capabilities does Tycoon 2FA give them that they wouldn’t have had before?
SPEAKER_00 8:25
Oh, um, so I think you know, first of all, it it gives them that authenticated session. So it gives them that access. So you don’t just have to rely on a bunch of passwords and you know usernames and credentials. You you try it a few times. This gives them that direct access. So I think you know that’s really, really key that you you can bypass multi-factoral authentication, which you know, we we we all try and use, you know, you get it coming in on your phone, you log it in, you know, you look at it and and and you put the details in. Um, it’s that immediate sign-on effect. You see you straight into that system as well. And then once you’re in, depending on your access level in that company, you can then get that lateral movement that that you can use. So again, you can go in and look at okay, well, we want to look at this pot of information here. How can we how can we use that information? We want to go with those customer details, want to go with those invoices, want to go to those banking details, and then they can start start drawing that out effectively, or they can just be straight into a bank and start clearing an account. You know, that that that’s the bottom line to some of this.
SPEAKER_03 9:27
I think as well that the other thing that it giv it gave them was stealth and resilience. Um there’s no good paying all this money and setting up all this infrastructure if immediately someone like Group IB spots you and shuts down your servers and reports you, you know. Uh and we know that cybercrime gangs and criminals in general think about that kind of counter-surveillance, counter-threat. But again, with Tycoon 2FA, we really got some great detail about how they actually went about that. For example, understanding when their phishing emails have been intercepted by a security researcher because you know they would they would try and get developer tools on the go. And as soon as the software spotted that, it would just direct them to a dead end. So as a security researcher, your ability to kind of get behind this, they were understanding that’s what security researchers would do and avoiding it. And for the people using the service, it meant just higher hit rates. You know, you’re not constantly getting bounce backs on your phishing emails, you’re not getting intercepted by threat researchers. It just gave them more, more, more time, more road to run down, I suppose.
SPEAKER_00 10:27
So the other part of what Jeff has said as well is the cost to this. So they were able to put a lower cost in to this, so the criminals were not paying as much, but that then goes into that volume side for them. So they could potentially make more money because they are selling more access or more product. So, like any business model, isn’t it? You know, if you can increase your market share, you can drop the price competitively to against another competitor. And, you know, their tools worked. So that then started building out their business model, which grew and grew and grew effectively.
SPEAKER_02 11:01
Uh Jeff, how big is the marketplace for fishing as a service?
SPEAKER_03 11:05
Um, phishing is still, you know, the weapon of choice for so many hacking gangs. It’s still the way in. Uh I can’t tell you the number of investigations I’ve done where everything gets very complicated, all seems very esoteric. But when you go back to the start, somebody received a phishing message, often a phishing email. It just is the way in. It’s it’s your you’ve got so many options. You’ve got so many people you can go after. And the bigger an organization is, the more people you can go after. And also, you’ve got multiple goes at each person. It’s not like you send one phishing email, it doesn’t work. You can send them another one the next day, the next hour. You can work on people. So there’s a reason this this this stuff really matters. It’s it’s integral still to a lot of cybercrime.
SPEAKER_02 11:45
And Craig, 89% market share for a Tycoon 2FA. That’s a pretty big chunk of the market. Um, you know, what separates it from other platforms like it?
SPEAKER_00 11:55
So I think you know, the one of the key ones is that access. You you’re almost getting immediate access, and you know, it’s you’re straight in. You’re not having to rely on, okay, we’ve got some passwords, we’ve got some credentials, we’ve got some usernames, let’s try it. You know, with this, you’re almost straight in. So it’s that it’s a good tool, it works, it does what it says on the tin effectively, and that information spreads around the criminal world as well. They they see how effective it is, and you are then drawn to that marketplace. So, again, you know, you’re as good as your product, um, and the trust element in this, and there is a bit of a trust element between cyber criminals, um, because if a tool works, great, you know, people go and use it. When it doesn’t work, it sort of breaks that trust down a little bit. But what you do is you just go and use someone else’s tool. So, because this tool was working, that was the growth behind that. And I think we saw group IB research showing that Tycoon 2FA was linked to more sort of 77,000 compromised accounts, just over nine months of tracking. So that’s some big numbers, effectively. And that’s just group IB. You know, you’ve had lots of sort of um security teams out there tracking these people and seeing that as well.
SPEAKER_02 13:08
Group IB reported that the number of active adversary in the middle capable fishing as a service platforms, that’s a mouthful, doubled between 2023 and 2024. As this economy grows, it’s even more surprising to hear that Tycoon 2FA has almost 90% market share. Jeff, can you paint a picture of what is meant when we talk about the criminal economy?
SPEAKER_03 13:33
Um, yeah, it’s it’s a it’s an industry, it’s a shadow version of the industry that exists above ground. Um, you know, if if you’re a business and you set up and you sell widgets on the internet, well, you need someone to host your website. You need someone to handle your payments, uh, you need someone if your user’s going to log in to provide the login, you might go to Google or Facebook or somebody like that for that. You know, you need to put all these components together. The criminal marketplace is a sort of mirror image of that. It’s quite rare that you find one crime group who’ve got all the angles covered. You know, stuff I’ve been investigating around money laundering, for example. You’d be surprised how many criminals don’t do their own laundering. It’s a very difficult thing. You have to understand bank accounts and swift systems and faster payments and all that kind of thing. Other people do that for you, you know, and you pay them a little bit of money for that. So, in the same way we have above-ground service providers who come forward and provide the service. On the underground, it’s exactly the same. Tycoon 2FA being an example of that.
SPEAKER_02 14:26
Are monopolies, though, like this common?
SPEAKER_03 14:29
In my experience, no. Uh that’s the remarkable thing about you know the claims being made about Tycoon 2FA. You know, if they did achieve genuinely a nearly 80, 89% dominance in the market, that’s incredible. And again, let’s look at that in comparison with legitimate industry. I I was thinking today about how how many monopolies I actually know of in my life. Like how many monopolistic organizations do I know of? I think Google search achieved very, very high rates. I think there’s a time when Google search was was really pushing towards kind of monopolistic. But even then there were still other search engines available and Microsoft pushed back with Bing, etc. Achieving a monopoly is really difficult because as soon as you come out with a good product, you’re gonna get imitators who are gonna sell it for cheap, cheaper. Now, again, you can compete against them, but also in the legitimate world, you have the opportunity to take them over. You know, that’s what Facebook did with Instagram, for example, with WhatsApp, Twitter did it with, I think it was Vine, the video service. So we’ve all seen all these things happen. You’ve got to really work on your own product, but simultaneously you’ve got to try and buy up or somehow outcompete your competitors. On the underworld side, there’s two things that are different. Firstly, you can try and do deals with your competitors, but you can’t take them over and do a sort of corporate integration like you can in the real world, in the legitimate world. These are criminals, you know. Can you trust that they’re really going to sell their business to you? These deals do happen, but they’re much more difficult to carry out. And the other big difference on the underground is you’ve got law enforcement nipping at your heels, trying to take your business away from you. You’ve got your competitors trying to tip off law enforcement about you to get you shut down so they can take your market share. So there’s forces that you don’t think about. So to achieve a monopoly like this is, and I hesitate to use this word, and I know Craig wouldn’t want to use it either, but it’s impressive. It was a quite a feat. Oh, that comes down to fantastic customer service, a really solid and smooth product, and just relentless pushing to get it in front of the right people.
SPEAKER_02 16:23
Maybe companies could take some uh notes from these guys. My next question was gonna be about uh something surprising in the criminal marketplace, about how it works that most people would be unfamiliar with. But I think your point there around criminals tipping off the police about their competition, I think that’s quite an interesting one.
SPEAKER_03 16:41
The other thing I would quickly add as well is, and again, a lot of people don’t think about this. If you’re gonna do something like Tycoon 2FA, you need talent, you need coders. You know, the coding behind this was, again, I hate to use the word, but impressive was certainly very competent. Again, that’s behind you know the the the effectiveness of it and the the market penetration. You need to hire those people, and they can go and work for not just another crime gang, they can go and work for anybody if they’re really good. They could work for Google and Microsoft. So, again, a lot of people don’t think about this. These crime gangs are in a market for talent, for coding talent, and so they have to compete. And so when we hear about, you know, in the Conti files, the BBC series I did, the Conti Ransomer Gang would offer bonuses and salaries and holiday pay, and people are often shocked and find that surprising, sometimes quite funny. But but that’s what you have to offer somebody to get them in your organization, otherwise they will go and work for somebody else. So talent competition and uh is something that comes up in the criminal world, but people don’t tend to think about that.
SPEAKER_00 17:35
And I think Jeff, Jeff, going back to your Conti um podcast as well, you know, great podcast on that investigation, but exactly to your point there, the recruitment process in this, and sometimes people are not necessarily criminals in the first instance, they are drawn in by an advert or something like that, yeah, and maybe they get involved to start when they might be on the peripheral of it, but then as that criminal group recognises their talent, there’s that hierarchy where you get promoted as well, like going back to holiday pay. But I think also the other part of this is that convergence now of crime. And Jeff talked about the money laundering side, so you you’re having different groups now franchising out the work or outsourcing certain bits of work because we’re really good at the technical thing. Let’s let’s focus on the technical side of it, but actually, we’ve got to monetize this. Okay, who does that for us? And we’re seeing organized crime groups whether they’re dealing with human trafficking, whether they’re doing drugs, whether they’re shipping arms, you know, that whole marketplace online, you know, that criminal marketplace now, it’s not just cyber criminals that are using that, it’s that real convergence of crime, and we’re seeing this right around the globe now where more stuff is online. So the criminals are almost like got this mirror of the real world effectively, and that businesses that they’ve set up, which are mimicking, you know, the normal banking system, for example, or you know, not quite the stock market, but you know, they have those sort of ratings as well. This is a five-star one. Look at all these trusted, you know, trusted reviews we’ve got and things like that. You know, they’re really taking advantage of that, but also they’re taking advantage of the people and drawing them into cybercrime as well.
SPEAKER_02 19:17
How are franchises built around services like Tycoon 2FA?
SPEAKER_03 19:22
Uh, you know, as a service provider, you need people to go out and sort of spread your product and to work on it and use it. And again, I think people maybe don’t fully appreciate how sometimes these criminal organizations work from the inside. You know, you’ve got a group of coders who are very good at writing code. You’ve hired them because they can code up a website, they can steal credentials, they can grab the session cookie, effectively the mechanics behind the password. That’s all great techie, cody stuff, but you do need people to spread this. If you’re going to have a successful product, you need salespeople, you need people to go out and use it and spread it and so on. And so that’s where the affiliates come in. And there’s this interesting, certainly around ransomware, there’s an interesting push-me-pull you between the affiliates who go and spread it and the coders who actually write it. And what’s fascinating, again, in ransomware is we can we’ve actually got a really useful metric to measure that. It’s the split when the ransom gets paid as to how much goes to the coders and how much goes to the affiliates who actually spread the virus and got the encryption done. It’s about 80-20, 20 going back to the coders and 80 going to the affiliates. And that to me is a very, very clear indication that without the affiliates, that industry dies. And we actually sometimes have fluctuations in those rates. A ransomware gang will say, well, you can keep 90% of the ransom. So you can see the power shift, the power fluctuation. It’s harder in the case of something like Tycoon to FA, I don’t know how much data we have on the affiliates and the split of money, but certainly there’s this group of people who are effectively going out and pushing this product. And then you’ve got this issue about how much kicks back to the sort of core coding group. But without the core coding group, you don’t have a product to go and sell. So yeah, I find that interesting, that interplay back and forth.
SPEAKER_02 20:58
Yeah, I think the latest research from Group IB saw 300 or so known affiliates using Tycoon 2FA and aggressive underground marketing was one of the ways they really differentiated themselves.
SPEAKER_03 21:12
And what’s interesting about that, sorry to chime in, but um the affiliates, I find it fascinating. Again, the power split between the affiliates and what you might call the core coders. So when Tycoon 2FA got pounced upon by multiple organizations, you know, the likes of Microsoft included, um they that infrastructure gets shut down. You know, Tycoon 2FA’s servers get shut down, it’s you know, web pages go down, all the infrastructure. But the affiliates potentially can just go and work with the next one in line. There’ll be another Tycoon 2FA up and coming, unfortunately. So again, there’s this thing of you know, would you want to be the Tycoon 2FA or service provider or the core coder? Or would you want to be an affiliate? Because an affiliate, you’re quite flexible, and you can you can effectively sign up to whichever service is next, multiple services even. So I find that. Power dynamic are quite interesting.
SPEAKER_02 22:02
Do you think it’s fair to say that Tycoon 2FA sort of operates almost like a legitimate service would?
SPEAKER_03 22:10
So what what’s interesting about the the Conti group, the ransomware gang I covered it for that BBC podcast, is they genuinely felt some of them, I say genuinely, they expressed very explicitly and openly and clearly that they felt they were providing a business service. I know this may sound completely insane to some people, but they felt that they were testing the security of their targets. And when the security failed because they encrypted the target, well, that was a useful service they provided. You know, look, we’ve we’ve discovered a weakness in your security, and now you’ve been encrypted and ransomware. So the ransom you’re paying isn’t a ransom, it’s a fee for the service we provided. I know people listening to this will think that’s just complete nonsense. But that’s how they sort of felt internally, or at least expressed themselves internally. So I do think there’s a sense where some people can say, well, I’m providing a service. And my sort of hunch with that is that doing these kinds of crimes, particularly extortion, but also cybercrime generally, day in, day out, these are smart people. Very difficult to build these services, involves a lot of brains. If you’re a smart person and you wake up every day and you’re doing crime, I think that’s actually psychologically quite taxing. It’s quite hard. So what you need is to reframe it in your brain. So, you know, the people in charge of this, and again, there’s been a person uh uh not charged, but but there’s proceedings out against civil proceedings out against the person believed to be behind Tycoon 2FA. This this chap’s named as Sad Freedy. I suspect somebody like that will think, well, I’ve got a business empire here, I’m creating this product. And day to day, that’s what they feel they’re doing. If they step back and they go, oh, hang on, I’m I’m involved in crime here, but they don’t step back. They just get involved in the business, they run it like a business, and that enables their brain to seal themselves off from the reality. You just wake up, you do your job, you answer emails, you get your code looking really good. That’s it. And you and you just never confront the fact of what you’re actually doing in the reality. I think that’s what goes on.
SPEAKER_02 24:02
Jeff, do these platforms actually invest in things like customer service?
SPEAKER_03 24:07
Absolutely, yeah. One of the very, very early uh sort of cybercrime enterprises was set up by a guy called Evgeny Bogachev, who went by the hacker name Slavic. Bogachev set up a piece of malware called Zeus, um, appropriately enough, the king of the gods. I mean, Zeus was very effective bank hacking malware. Um and he had fantastic customer service. You know, if you emailed Slavic any any other day or night, you’d get a response. And in those days, it probably was just him, if maybe a very small team, but more likely just him replying and saying, Well, yes, I know that having difficulty with that plug-in of the software, but don’t worry, in version 2.1.1, I will be updating that in my sort of next version of Zeus. Customer service is actually at the heart of this and has been for a while. Um, because that’s how how you evolve, that’s how you get people’s uh attention. But more importantly, that’s how you get people’s trust. You know, in this criminal economy, there’s not a lot of trust going around because you’re working with crooks. And so you need to kind of work out ways that people can trust you. And good, fast, effective customer service, and I know this may sound nuts to people listening to this, is part of that. You know, if if you send a message to somebody and they don’t give you a reply, you think, well, can I trust this software? You’re already thinking, can I trust this person? But if they apply quickly, if the software is solid, if it looks good, if it’s a smooth experience, you think to yourself, right, this is this is someone I can do business with. And that’s super important, I think, in in the organized crime economy.
SPEAKER_02 25:31
Yeah, so you I mean, it sounds like you’d agree with that reputation and marketing do play an important part in getting and retaining customers right.
SPEAKER_03 25:42
Yeah, yeah. And and you know, the the the way this, from what I’ve seen, the screen grabs, the way this was sold and sort of marketed in Telegram, you know, I think the importance of Telegram uh is often again overlooked. It’s it’s not just an encrypted messaging platform. You can also publish effectively web pages, for want of a better word, in Telegram. You’ve got a shop window and a secure messaging platform tied in in one. And what that’s meant is in Telegram, your product needs to look really slick. You know, you somebody goes into a Telegram group is checking this out, the screen grabs have to be there, the tutorials have to be there, because that’s that’s effectively a sales window beyond just a messaging platform.
SPEAKER_00 26:17
Just on another point there, Jeb, it’s about the product as well. You know, you can have a product and it might be a really good product, but you you don’t have the advertising right for it, it doesn’t work correctly, it breaks down, it doesn’t do what it says on the tin. And I think this is where Tycoon 2FA sort of got it right essentially, because you don’t end uh don’t end up with 83% of the market share in the monopoly if you don’t have product that is working and is making money and making returns for for all of those involved. So I think you know this is an example where you did have some people with some good business acronym. You know, the product they have was an illegal product, but they marked it very well, sold it very well, and the returns on it were were pretty high as well for everybody involved.
SPEAKER_02 27:00
What does recruitment look like in this space, Craig?
SPEAKER_00 27:04
This this can take a number of different ways. So you you’ve you’ve got you know, you use your way through Telegram, things like that as well. You’ve got the adverts go out, and sometimes people are recruited through normal channels. Um, because you know, you need developers, you need coders, and where are they going to be? They’re gonna be out there somewhere on the internet, somewhere plugged in, and they are gonna see this going on, and that’s one of the ways that they’ll be recruited, but also within Typhoon Turf A, they’ve probably had a whole HR section. Well, I say whole HR section, but they all had someone’s prime responsibility that they would have run that as a business. Okay, where are we short at the moment? Well, we need someone with these skills. Okay, how do we target people with those skills? Where do we go to? And this comes right back to sort of 2012, 13, 14 in the UK, when you have these kiddies in a bedroom to start with, they were playing around on the internet, Jeff would know this, you know, Lizard Squad and others from from back in the day. You know, that wasn’t done for financial game, that that was done for sort of giggles, shall we say, the lols. But once they started to realize that they can make money from this, that’s when that model went more business-like in that criminal world. But we did have, and I think we discussed this with Mark Sutchins on the previous case. There’s kids out there that are online, they’re in these sort of chat forums, they’re talking to these groups, and effectively they’re groomed. So they’re groomed by cyber criminals who bring them in, they might be given some small tasks to do to start with. But you know, you want to please, don’t you? You want to make friends, so they’ll try really hard. And over time, that recruitment will turn into okay, well, let’s just try this. And they might think, Well, actually, what am I doing? Is it illegal, not illegal, or it might just be to one side, they don’t worry about that so much. And then before you know it, you’re you’re part of that that criminal enterprise, but you might not just be talking to one criminal group as well. So you could end up talking to lots of different criminal groups, affiliate groups, all sorts. Um, and it’s a big old world out there, isn’t it? You know, we we know you know it’s hard to get a job in cybersecurity because if you don’t have the qualifications and experience, sometimes it’s hard to get in there with AI coming in now, some of those lower-level jobs are going, so you can’t get that experience. So I do worry a little bit about where we’re going at the moment with you know the amount of people online around the world, the amount of tutorials out there, the amount of information out there, that sometimes you’ll follow the path of least resistance, and that’s what happens in organized crime groups. You you start at that bottom rung, you recruit it in, you start doing those minor points to start with, but slowly you’ll work your way up through an organization. But I think what’s key in this part is that technical capability, and that’s always what those cybercrime groups, you know. Why is it that we have those big technology companies have grown? Because you know, they’ve attracted talent, they’ve retained talent, but the talent will still move around. And it’s the same in that criminal world as well.
SPEAKER_02 30:03
CriB’s research estimated uh Tycoon 2FA was responsible for almost half, it was about 44% of all credential theft attacks in 2025 globally, which I mean just shows you the result of providing a huge number of operators who previously didn’t have that technical ability, but you give them access to enterprise-grade MFA bypass. What impact, Craig, are these platforms having on the overall theft chain?
SPEAKER_00 30:34
Oh, it’s a huge, huge impact. I mean, it it’s becoming far more industrialized. So, in terms of that quantity that we’re seeing now, there’s a lot more going on because these tools are working. You know, you’re not reliant on that fragmented sort of business model here in particular. You had a tool that worked particularly well, and people then became attracted to that tool. You had the affiliates then pulling that tool in, using it in their own enterprises. So you saw the growth, and again, we we talked about that monopoly part as well. So, yeah, it’s got a it’s very successful, unfortunately, because it does work. And I said earlier, you know, it does what it says on the tin, and that word of mouth, that community passes that information through, much like we’re doing at the moment on that sort of AI world when we talk about these different AI companies, and somebody comes over. Wow, everybody looks at it, everybody jumps on it, everybody tries it. Um, but that’s okay in that world because we’re doing it for research or something like this. Whereas criminals are doing that to enable them to commit crime, take money out of businesses and people as well. And that’s the hard part of this. So that will increase that crime impact as well, and that’s on an international level.
SPEAKER_02 31:55
At what stage, Craig, of that interaction does the affiliate become the sort of active party?
SPEAKER_00 32:01
That’s a really good question. So, yeah, where when is it they cross that line, I suppose, for committing a criminal offence? And I think, you know, we used to have a we’ve got an offence in the UK called Gone Equipped. So, you know, it’s the ways and means that you would stop someone walking down the street at night and they had some gloves and a screwdriver in their pocket in the middle of summer, you know, you you you might have an offence of go and equipped, and that’s you know, you could deal with that locally quite easily. I think when the affiliate becomes an active party, it’s right at the start. So if they are looking on these platforms, they are looking for tools, to me, they’re an active party. Would we get a prosecution home at that stage? I I think that’ll be difficult, but in terms of their activity, they are then driving that market as well. The next part of that is when they take the tools and then as an affiliate they deploy them and use them, and that’s when they’re effectively breaking the law where they can then be investigated. But I think to the side of this as well, we we have a whole intelligence picture which is quite hard to pull together because who’s doing what’s out there? How do we trace that? How do we track that? How do we find out whose hands are actually on the keypads, who has pressed that button and committed that criminal act? And I think that’s one of the challenges in law enforcement that we still go down this judicial prosecutoral outcome and actually within that cybercrime space, and certainly this space, sometimes that disruption model, and I don’t want to talk about offensive cybercrime work at the moment because that’s a whole different program, I guess. But how do we do that legitimately with the platforms that are legitimately hosting X, Y, and Z, but also inadvertently they are hosting those criminal platforms as well. So it’s quite a nuanced space. And I think, Jeff, you’ve you’ve looked into this over the years as well. So you must have had quite a different view from me as a law enforcement official, because obviously I I see certain certain certain levels of things.
SPEAKER_03 34:12
Yeah, it’s interesting. Yeah, and with this this case, the Tycoon 2FA case, it was it was private industry that sort of worked together alongside you, Apollo, and probably others as well, um, to take down the infrastructure. And that will really have damaged that organization. However, if they’re as smart as we think they are, they probably knew that was going to happen and either had an exit plan or you know, they’ve uh they’ve made their money, they’ll go and spend it on you know, Lamborghinis and yachts, or they’ve got a shadow infrastructure set up that they can just hop on board. I’m not saying that that doesn’t make it worth doing to shut these things down. Hurting and causing business pain to these organizations is definitely worth doing. But it’s possible they just moved on. But the other thing I found interesting about this was there is a named individual, believed to be based in Pakistan, who apparently was behind all of this, set it all up. And I thought, well, it’s fascinating. I’ll I’ll Google and I’ll find the you know the FBI, the Department of Justice complaint, or maybe some details from Interpol and so on. But no, that there is a civil prosecution against that person from Microsoft. And it’s fascinating, there’s some interesting detail about that, but it really is just an accusation. What it basically says is, you know, Microsoft has found details of this person. We we we believe he’s behind it. And we’re so we’re we’re prosecuting, we’re effectively suing him for damages. What’s different about that to a criminal prosecution is people like the FBI have to actually present some evidence as to why they say this. And that’s usually for me where the story gets really interesting because you learn how they manage to track this person down. So we’re just in this really interesting place where there’s somebody we think out there is behind it, but we’re just going on one company’s word. And I’d love to have more detail. Maybe there’s a sealed indictment somewhere, and this will come out eventually. Uh, if I was that chap, I’d certainly be worried about that. But we’re in this interesting space of not just private action against a crime group like this, but also then private, kind of private prosecution, civil prosecution. I thought that was quite a novel bit about this as well.
SPEAKER_00 35:58
The Microsoft digital crime judg’s a tactic they’ve been using for for a few years now. And this comes back to sometimes it’s hard to get that judicial threshold, and there’s enough in there for one company. But again, this sort of demonstrates the reach of international technology companies. So, you know, they can go to a jurisdiction where they can use civil legislation, and because they’re all based, they’re all in the same company, it’s very much joined together. Law enforcement really tries hard to do the same thing with organisations such as Europol, Interpol, Afropol, Asinopol, and all the other police organisations, that coordination effort, but again, constricted by those jurisdictional boundaries, and we talked previously about the new um cybercrime convention that’s been put through the UN. So that’s trying to put some not rules but give some common language to how police can exchange information. But you know what, that that takes a great deal of time. When we look at the civil side of this, that that could be a lot quicker. And to Jeff’s point, you may not need such a high burden of proof. So you then have to weigh that up as well, because that’s a call for a for a private company, and I think when we get to these court cases, but certainly what I would like to see is the civil cases going through and a finding, but then a confiscation made against that criminal or criminal group as well. That to me is going to be the one where we are taking the money off of because we talk about trying to raise the bar to cyber criminals and we’ve got to take down infrastructure. They’re in this for the money. So, how do we get in there, identify the money, and actually block that and pull that back? But also, who’s that money then go to? Because where’s the victim pot in all of this as well? So I think we’re going to have some interesting cases over the next few years. That’s certainly something I’m pushing for for the work I still do is okay, on the prevention and disruption side, how do we disrupt, but then get that money back to the victims of crime?
SPEAKER_03 38:04
And that’s and that’s really interesting because one of the parties that was in on this case was Coinbase, the cryptocurrency, largely cryptocurrency company. Clearly, no surprises, you know, people behind Tycoon 2FA were using crypto to move their money around, probably take payments as well. Possibly, very possibly, Coinbase had a handle on where those crypto transactions were, and maybe has frozen some of them or capture some of them. So you’re right, Craig, if the if the Microsoft civil action does result in some kind of confiscation order, you can sort of daisy chain that together with maybe some of the Coinbase investigation, and suddenly the criminal logs into their Bitcoin wallet and the money’s either inextricable or was gone. Um, so that’s it’s interesting how that will work out. But again, you’ve got to juggle different jurisdictions. It’s yeah, it’s interesting. It’s interesting. Keeps the lawyers happy.
SPEAKER_02 38:50
Are the developers actually doing anything wrong? Are they breaking the law when they make this app? Because you know, when someone shoots someone in a in a Paris suburb, you don’t sue Heckler and Cock for manufacturing a machine gun, right? So are they doing anything wrong?
SPEAKER_03 39:08
Go on, one for you, Craig. I’ve got thoughts, but I’m not a prosecutor in this generally. It’s a good question, though.
SPEAKER_00 39:14
I think it’s men’s rear, isn’t it? This is what we’re talking about here. The men’s rear, when you’re doing this, you you can say, look, we’re doing this for researcher purposes. And I know when we negotiated the United Nations on the new cybercrime convention, that is one of the questions that came out in all of this is how do you differentiate between a cyber criminal as opposed to a genuine cybersecurity researcher or someone that’s developed some software because they want to test a vulnerability, you know. So I think you’re right. If you take so I’ll take the example of someone driving a car, so they drive a car, they go and do their shopping, they go on holiday, they pick the kids up from school. No problem at all. They drive a car and commit a robbery or a violent assault, even using that car or not, it is the individual behind the wheel at that time the offence is committed. So, again, this comes into the different legislations in countries as well. I know some countries have slightly sketchier legislation than others, some have stronger legislation, um, and also about how the judiciary side about enforces laws from one jurisdiction into another jurisdiction. And Jeff’s followed that, so I’m not setting you up here, Jeff, but you follow that really closely, haven’t you? Some of the investigative work you’ve done about those sort of hard-to-reach jurisdictions.
SPEAKER_03 40:33
Yeah, yeah, definitely. Um, I mean, you can look at this from a sort of pure UK side, right? We have Computer Misuse Act in the UK, unauthorised access to a network. Clearly, Tycoon 2FA was that, it’s completely tailor-made for that. And therefore, the person who’s running Tycoon 2FA, I think, would find it almost impossible in court to argue they didn’t know that’s what it was being used for, which makes them an accessory. But that’s in the UK. And if we’re what’s been reported is to be believed this individual is in Pakistan. So you’ve got to look at the Pakistani law. You know, what are the laws around Computer Misuse Act, identity theft, you know, personal data use in Pakistan? Do they match those in the UK? Can you then get somebody in Pakistan to issue a warrant, a court to issue a warrant? Um, are they going to be interested in doing that? Have you got enough evidence to convince them of that? How do you get that on the go? Do you need teams on the ground in that country? Uh and even then, you’ve then got expedition of that person to the UK to be prosecuted under UK law. What’s our expedition treaty like? So that’s, I mean, I’m not loyal or prosecutor, but that’s just the steps that I kind of know of. There’s probably another infinite number of steps behind the scenes that I don’t know of. So it’s it’s uh it’s tricky.
SPEAKER_02 41:45
Well, the phishing as a service model clearly complicates things when it comes to investigations, and we’re seeing more hands uh working on building on the platform with more resources than individual groups who develop and deploy their own attacks. And Craig, in what ways does the growth in attacks create additional problems for defenders?
SPEAKER_00 42:07
It’s volume. It’s it’s pure and simple volume. You know, we we drown under information at the moment. And also, you know, cybercrime is just one priority for law enforcement, and our models set up to work in a very local way. So, you know, UK, we’ve got local policing, regional policing, national policing, and international policing, and we’ve got some good capabilities in our country, really good capabilities. Other countries just do not have those capabilities, and the criminals will exploit that. So when you look at you know, countries whose digital economies or digital infrastructure is growing, the criminals will grow and grow and flourish in that area as well, potentially. And they won’t just be attacking their people in that country, they’ll be attacking people around the world. So, so the growth is always going to be a challenge. And I think I’m not going to quote the figures, but if you look at the sort of commodity-based crime, so yeah, we’ve still got drug trafficking, human trafficking, gun running, and things like that. But things like violent crime has dropped off in certain countries because criminals have moved, because we’ve designed out crime in certain areas, but we still haven’t designed out crime in the digital world because we still have vulnerabilities there, and this is where AI is showing how big those vulnerabilities are, doing it really, really quickly now and at scale. So, again, you’ve got the the criminal side exploiting that. Everybody’s trying to patronize vulnerabilities as quickly as possible. But you know, we’ve got many, many doors and windows open on the internet and into come uh countries and companies, and criminals and other actors will continue to take advantage of those.
SPEAKER_02 43:43
Jeff, to what extent can investigators learn about the organization by watching how the product develops over time?
SPEAKER_03 43:52
I think that’s certainly useful insight for investigators. You can sort of see the direction of travel, you can maybe get a sense of how well resourced the criminal. Organization is, you know, if they suddenly become much more professional, if they start to branch out and diversify, offer new products, you can kind of see the growth of it. The frustrating thing is you can’t kind of see what’s happening behind the scenes. You know, is that a result of a merger between that gang and another gang? Um has that organization actually declined because it’s been infiltrated by law enforcement? So it’s it’s it’s you can kind of track things, you can see who’s getting big relative to other people. But what’s actually going on behind the scenes is still a challenge, I think, for investigators. They’re just looking at the sort of front-end product of it.
SPEAKER_02 44:33
When that product changes so quickly, does it impact how investigators track the operation, Craig?
SPEAKER_00 44:40
Yeah, I think I think the challenge to law enforcement is having the capabilities to see what is going on behind the scenes. And that’s why working with the private sector is so important. And yeah, we’ve got multiple private sector security companies, threat intelligence companies working with law enforcement. But again, we you know, we’re not just looking at one group in one country impacting one country, we’re looking at one group diversified around the world. Um, we’re looking at you know them impacting in different countries as well. So you don’t always see the level of reporting. And again, this is where the sort of private sector come together, such as they did here, can really draw that information together, and you then get that sort of coalition. When I I talked about cybercrime previously, I talked about you have high harm, high impact, high volume, and high interest. Those are my four buckets that I put it in, and that high harm one, you know, is is is you know, real, real monetary impact or critical infrastructure, or actually, you know, people be harmed physically. Then you’ve got that high impact that sort of fills into that critical infrastructure. High volume is what I would say we’ve got the sort of Tycoon 2fa in, and that is becoming more rampant, more effective, more efficient. But it’s a high interest one that I’ll always come back to that I would leverage off from a senior official in Interpol or government side of things and say, look, this is impacting that that country or this particular business group, and once you get that political buy-in to it, um, and Interpol’s non-political, by the way, you know, we we couldn’t do that, but we get that buy-in from a community group, whether it be government or private sector, that’s when we can start pulling our resources together. And Europol has a very successful impact model for doing that when they prioritize certain types of crimes, because this is what is seeing as causing that sort of high harm and high impact to countries and businesses as well.
SPEAKER_02 46:40
Jeff, is it difficult to separate the platform operators from the affiliates using the service?
SPEAKER_03 46:48
Um most of the time, in my experience, when investigators and law enforcement go after a service, they’re looking at the service, they’re looking at the people who run it. It seems to me they kind of come across affiliates as part of that process. Um sometimes they will manage to find an affiliate who’s senior, physically locate them, nick them, and then say to them, look, you’ve got two choices, you know, cooperate or long prison sentence. And so you can flip an affiliate and you can work your way in. Um other times they they know the names of the affiliates that they use because they hang out in the channels. But often the law enforcement direction is towards the sort of service provider. And again, Taiku and Turfa is a good example of that. The problem with that is yes, you take down the service at the heart of it, but and again, we have this with people like uh the Lockbit ransomware gang, you know, that the gang gets named, Dmitry Koroshev gets named as being the man behind Lockbit. There’s dozens, I think probably a couple of hundred of affiliates, some of whom are serious heavyweight cybercriminals, apparently, who then just scatter and join the next ransomware service. Same with Tycoon 2FA, those affiliates probably have gone off and joined other sort of phishing kind of networks as affiliates. Uh so it’s it’s difficult. It is difficult. I do think more can be done on the affiliates, but it’s a hard challenge because fundamentally the watering hole they all gather around is the service, the core service, something like Tycoon 2FA. So inevitably that’s the kind of center of gravity. So that’s where you go for. Um, yeah, it’s tricky one. Tricky one. I’m glad I’m not in the law enforcement shoes actually on that front.
SPEAKER_02 48:18
Fray, what would meaningful disruption look like in this space? Does that mean like identifying and prosecuting individuals or degrading the infrastructure or you know, some combination of those?
SPEAKER_00 48:30
I think you know, it’s some combo combination of it, as Jeff says, you know, you’ve got everybody around a watering hole, and you know, you need to catch as many people whilst they’re drinking from that watering hole, but you also need to ensure that that watering hole doesn’t fill up the gang as well, to use that analogy. Um, in terms of Interpol, we did it under four areas prevention, detection, investigation, and disruption. So the first key part is how do we prevent it? So, why is it? And we come back to why were Tycoon 2FA successful? Because there was a vulnerability. So, how how could we prevent that? So, let’s design that out in the first instance. So, that comes into that traditional crime prevention piece. Then it’s about detecting it. How do we detect it? So we’ve got to draw those different signals in, and that is very challenging for law enforcement, as we sort of spoke about earlier, is there’s so much information out there, you’re almost drowning in data and information, but then you’ve got to turn that into actionable intelligence, which comes back to the investigation. How do you pull that investigation? Well, we had 196 countries. Now I know I could go and speak to this country and I’ll get a great response because they have got good capability, good capacity. I go into another country where they had no capability, no capacity, but they had millions of victims. So, how do we then investigate in that country? And then that comes into the fourth point there’s disruption. So, where do we that do that disruption? And it’s not like taking down a traditional drugs group in the UK that’s operating from London across Southeast England. You know, you look at the networks, you follow the phone data, you follow the vehicles, you could do a great big bust in one day, everybody’s scooped up, and you might have a few people on the outliers, which you’re aware of and you’ll keep an eye on. But you basically close that operation down in one day. As Jeff says here, you know, when the disruption’s done, there’ll be a scatter, but they won’t actually have to scatter because they’re already somewhere else in the world, because that’s where they’re operating from. So for me, the actual key to the disruption is doing the prevention, if that makes sense. So getting ahead and making sure that yeah, we the criminals are not going to find a way to leverage that vulnerability. But that that’s yeah, that’s me being very simplistic in in that way as well. Um, and that but that’s come back to the law enforcement is there to protect communities from harm, which is why the Robert Peel hundreds of years ago, law enforcement was set up and policing was set up because you know, as communities, we decided we didn’t want harm coming to you know people in their homes and houses and things like that as well. So we’re just applying those principles again now, but that disruption does look different, I would say, now than maybe about traditional. But don’t get me wrong, traditional judicial system has to be there. And you know, my aim is always to try and lock up the bad people and throw away the key if I can, because I want to give people a break from that criminal or cyber criminal, and the place to do that is when they’re in prison effectively.
SPEAKER_02 51:33
Is it possible that teams are creating a sort of hydra effect through smaller takedowns? Like when should smaller takedowns be prioritized over longer-term tactics and vice versa?
SPEAKER_00 51:45
I mean, this is one of the discussions we used to have all the time when we’re doing investigations. You know, you’re looking at those groups, and you know, you can see what you can see, but there’s other bits that you would not have access to or you wouldn’t see as well. And again, bringing the private sector in helps shine the lights on those other groups. And then you have to look at about okay, what happens if you take this group down at this time? What’s going to happen to that group or in that country? But also you have to take the private sector into account here because they own the infrastructure. So, how do we work for the private sector to take that infrastructure down? Because the lawyers might be saying, Well, hang on a second, you know, actually, we can’t take that infrastructure down because that breaks our terms and conditions and things like that as well. So we we have to find a bit of a balancing act amongst this as well. Um, and you know, when we do do the takedowns, there’s a lot of publicity around that, but also how do we clear that up afterwards? And we we we spoke in the UK and also eatable about mitigation of scale. So, how do you, when you’re taking someone down, how do you take all that information out and then use that in terms of a safety exercise to say, okay, well, first of all, this is what we’ve seen, this is what we need to do to take out that vulnerability, but we don’t all advertise it too much just in case another criminal group come along and take advantage of it. But also, there’ll be a lot of people there that have been victims of cybercrime, which we can then go to and actually you know work with them to help protect them in the future as well from becoming repeat victims of cybercrime because we don’t want repeat victims in in crime if we can help it.
SPEAKER_02 53:22
Yeah, amazingly, you know, Group IB researched uh Tycoon 2FA activity. There were 77,000 compromised accounts over a nine-month period of tracking, and those 77,000 spanned 10,000 unique corporate domains, which is that’s big. Now, given that you know a compromised session token gives you access to email, SharePoint, OneDrive Teams, and every Microsoft intra-ID connected application, it’s definitely a priority for security teams to understand how to defend against this. Jeff, how can organizations prepare to defend against an attack using platforms like Tycoon 2FA?
SPEAKER_03 54:06
It is really difficult. Um, and I thought about this that we introduced multi-factor authentication because basically your password and your username and your email address were just out there. You know, we were getting to the point where just everybody’s email address and a password attached to it was out there. So we introduced multi-factor authentication. Uh inevitably, a counter-industry, a shadow industry sort of grows up uh around that, and that’s what Tycoon2F8 sort of represents. Um, I think it’s starting to think ahead that when we introduce a mitigation or defense or an innovation in defense, what’s going to be the reaction to that? You’ve almost got to guarantee there’s going to be a reaction to every action we take. So, you know, if we if we try and introduce a mitigation around this, and there are mitigations, you know, you can reset um session cookies constantly to try and deter against this. Um, you could do more public education about this kind of thing, but there is going to be something after it. Um, so I think number one, organizations taking the advice of, again, a lot of the private companies that did the Tycoon 2FA takedown came out with really good advice about here’s how you can harden up against this. You could have prevented this, here’s how you do it. There’s various changes you can make behind the scenes in terms of how your login works and uh the sort of infrastructure, as I say, resetting constantly. Because the next thing I think coming down the track, kind of interesting, Craig’s point uh take on this, is is this idea of the session cookie. You know, once you steal someone’s session cookie, you’re logged in. No password needed, no username, no MFA. You’re just logged in as them, and you’re logged in pretty much for good, unless somebody’s sort of you know resetting their the their cookies. Again, let’s look ahead to that then. Let’s have let’s work out how we how we deal with that before we just get inundated by that. Maybe I’ve missed something. Maybe it’s been some big announcement that I missed, but I am interested in where that goes.
SPEAKER_02 55:54
How dangerous is it, uh, Jeff, to consider MFA a sufficient protection?
SPEAKER_03 56:00
It’s really annoying because it’s been the thing we’ve been pushing for ages. And I always tell people, oh, you know, do that thing where you get a little code to your phone. Look, it I think it still works a lot of the time. So I’m like Tycoon 2FA comes along and it does bust it. But there are things behind the scenes organizations can do to get around that. And again, I think for users, that idea of something like two-fact authentication is only one layer. You can get tricked on that. So that education piece of look, this isn’t the be-all and end all, just because you’re being asked for a code and send a code doesn’t mean that the website you’re looking at uh you can trust it. You know, you you’ve got to almost in the same way organizations have defence in depth, you’ve got to sort of reach out to the humans in this and say, look, we need you to do defence in depth. You know, unfortunately that we’re not there is no silver bullet we can give you, and even MFA isn’t the silver bullet. I really hate that because it’s a complicated message to get out. As a journalist, I like less complicated messages, but I think that’s where we are.
SPEAKER_02 56:58
Craig, how often should organizations be monitoring session tokens and other risk signals?
SPEAKER_00 57:04
I think it it’s the risk factor in all of this, isn’t it? As a company, you know, you’re going to be open in one way or another. So, you know, are you monitoring all the risks and are you scoring them correctly? You know, you don’t need high levels on everything. So identification of those high-risk accounts, but also the privileged users within companies and organizations. And it’s almost like a badge of honour. Well, I’ve got access to all these systems. Well, yeah, you might have, but do you actually need them to do your job? And I think, you know, as companies, we’re historically we’ve just given access, not you know, carte blanche, but we haven’t really looked at people’s roles and level of access, and also how long can they be locked on before they’re logged out and they’ve got to come back in and be clear because things like that as well. So there’s there’s different measures that we can put into play here, but you know, it it this has evolved over time, and those vulnerabilities are still there, and we haven’t quite marry it up. But I would I would sort of also caveat that again. You know, have we stopped traditional crime? No, we haven’t. We’ve sort of mitigated it, we’ve reduced it in certain areas, and we’ve moved it. And I think what we’ve done, we we’ve moved a lot of crime now, unfortunately, online into fraud and cybercrime, and the amount of people out there that are able to, you know, fairly quickly, fewer few clicks get into um some sort of underground forum or network, or they’re chatting, you know, they can then start looking at, oh, okay, I can make money from this effectory. And we’ve seen that in Africa. We we’ve we’ve seen whole villages that are sustained by committing fraud and cybercrime because they’ve got no other way of making money. And prior to being connected to the internet, you know, they they really struggled. And I’m not saying it’s happened just in Africa, it’s happening around the world as well. But as we look at that digitalization across the world, we’ve really, really got to understand that security side and make sure that you know we’re making the things that we really need to have secure as secure as possible. But, you know, that’s the challenge that that we all have working in this space. Whether you’re a defender, you know, we’re up against attackers all the time.
SPEAKER_02 59:18
Well, gents, thank you so much for your time today and your expertise. Jeff, amazing to see you again. I hope you’re doing well. I hope we speak again soon. Any books coming out?
SPEAKER_03 59:28
Not as not as yet, but stay tuned. I literally, as I close this out, I’ve got a meeting with my publisher tomorrow. So wish me luck.
SPEAKER_02 59:36
I’ll send you my address.
SPEAKER_01 59:41
Your data is valuable and it’s under attack. But for every threat actor working in the shadows, there’s someone who’s made it their life’s work to understand them and stop them. Who are these people protecting our most valuable data from falling into the wrong hands? Who are the defenders?






