Ransomware Negotiation: What Enterprises Should Know Before They're Hit

What Does a Ransom Demand Look Like?

A ransom demand appears as a note left on encrypted systems, an email from the attackers, or a link to a dark web payment portal. Many of these notes follow standard templates used by ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) programs, so the structure and wording look very similar from one incident to the next.

The note explains how to contact the attacker, usually via a Tor-based chat portal or an encrypted messenger such as TOX. ​Ransom demands are designed with a sense of urgency, with deadlines ranging from 24 hours to a few days. 

Attackers often include proof of compromise, such as screenshots of stolen files or directory listings. To prove this, some groups offer a sample decryption file for free, claiming they hold the necessary keys. 

What attackers want you to do:

Ransom notes push you toward immediate action:

• Contact them within the deadline (usually 24-72 hours).
• Don’t involve law enforcement or recovery services.
• Pay in Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency.
• Don’t try to decrypt files yourself.

To help organizations stay vigilant, Group-IB maintains a comprehensive database of ransomware notes from the most active groups, analyzing their malware, extortion tactics, and tools.

What Is Ransomware Negotiation?

Ransomware negotiation is the process of managing direct communication with attackers during an incident to help organizations regain some control and verify claims. 

It helps you to respond on your own terms while the wider response continues by:

• Buying time for investigation. Forensic teams assess the scope of encryption and data theft while you keep attackers engaged.
• Forcing proof of access. Attackers must prove they hold decryption keys and stolen data before you consider payment.
• Enabling recovery planning. Your team checks backups and estimates restoration time while negotiations continue.​

The negotiation approach differs depending on how each ransomware type applies pressure. 

Encryption-focused attacks 

In attacks focused only on encryption (for example, classic locker or crypto ransomware that does not involve data theft), the priority in negotiation is to obtain and test a working decryptor. Victims often ask for a small set of files to be decrypted first to confirm that recovery is technically possible before discussing any further steps.

Double extortion 

In double extortion scenarios, attackers both encrypt data and threaten to leak or publish it on Dedicated Leak Sites. Negotiation then has to consider the incident as a major data breach, including regulatory and legal exposure. 

Even when gangs promise to delete stolen data after payment, Group-IB’s investigations have shown cases where leaked data remained accessible, so organizations should not rely on such guarantees and must plan for the possibility that information will still be exposed.

Our experts also observed that ransomware operators are refining tactics around data exfiltration and extortion to increase leverage during negotiations. In Group-IB’s annual High-Tech Crime Trends report, we recorded 5,066 attacks published on leak sites in 2024, a 10% increase over the previous year.

What To Do Before You Contact the Attacker

Before contacting ransomware actors, organizations should first stabilize their systems, coordinate with legal and incident response teams, and gather key facts about the situation. Actions taken in the first hours matter more than anything said to the attackers.

The steps below show what to set up before initiating contact, so negotiation aligns with your overall response.

1. Assemble the core team

Ransomware response involves coordinated decision-making by security, legal, business continuity, and executive leadership. The incident response lead for each team coordinates technical containment and forensic analysis. Legal assesses regulatory requirements, sanction risks, and breach notification guidelines.

Payment authority and business continuity permissions are granted only to C-level executives. Cyber insurance (if available), breach coach response, and coverage terms review. All communication with the attacker should go through a single point in order to ensure a consistent message and avoid inadvertently committing.

2. Confirm restore options and expected downtime

Teams must decide if independent recovery is viable before engaging with the attackers. Backup validation assesses whether an organization can restore encrypted systems without incurring costs. If it takes five days to restore and the revenue loss is $2 million per day, a $1 million ransom may seem rational, even if this ignores other considerations.

Even if payment is being considered, it does not guarantee deletion or non-disclosure of stolen data.

3. Validate what is at risk

Forensic analysis must identify the extent of both encryption and data exfiltration. Cooperate with incident response teams to provide confirmation of whether exfiltration has actually taken place, which systems are implicated, and which types of data are likely to have been compromised. Retain evidence for compliance with legal and regulatory needs.

The extent of the security incident is assessed using network logs, endpoint detection telemetry, and threat intelligence on the relevant ransomware variant. Certain groups, such as RansomHub, are famous for methodologies that can help you predict patterns of when data might be exposed.

4. Legal constraints

Most governments and international bodies strongly discourage paying ransoms and warn that doing so can fund crime or violate sanctions, but payments are not universally prohibited in law. Organizations should always consult legal counsel and relevant authorities before considering any payment or negotiation.

For example, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury imposes strict liability, and therefore, organizations may incur civil penalties for negotiating with a sanctioned entity. Threat actors must be vetted against OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals list prior to any payment. 

Ransomware Negotiation Strategies That Help Regain Control

Effective negotiation with ransomware actors is about regaining control of the timeline and decisions. The strategies below show how prepared teams can buy time to understand what happened while technical teams work on recovery, and decide on next steps on their own terms.

1. Establishing controlled communication

In controlled communication, a single designated individual serves as the central point for all interactions with attackers. This prevents mixed signals, unauthorized concessions, and tactical blunders that will sink your negotiation positions.

The official negotiator follows a well-established documentation protocol. The first contact acknowledges receipt of the ransom demand and requests additional time for senior leadership to make a decision. For legal, regulatory, and insurance reasons, communication should be fully documented.

2. Buying time and reducing demands

In ransomware incidents, time is the biggest asset. Each hour provides forensic staff with an opportunity to collect evidence, ensures backup staff validate restore paths, and legal staff to finalize sanctions screening.

Negotiators often delay by requesting additional time to obtain financial approvals, confirm ownership of the data, or assess the impact on operations. These negotiations can stall, then pick up again when new offers are made within clear limits, such as a maximum insurance payout or board approval.

3. Demand proof and verify exposure

Decrypting a test file serves as proof that one can decrypt files. An organization offers a single or multiple files encrypted with minimal sensitivity, and attackers return with the decrypted versions.

Attackers must show proof that they have your data. Organizations should request solid evidence, such as actual files, directory listings, or samples from specific systems, rather than just screenshots.

​Coordinate with incident response to determine if exfiltration occurred, which systems were affected, and what class of data is likely impacted. Forensic examination may show that exfiltration claims outstrip actual theft and can be used as a lever in negotiations.

Group-IB Incident Response teams work alongside your legal and IT teams to capture forensic evidence, verify attacker claims, and prepare documentation for regulators and insurers. Our responders also work with in-house communications leads to decide what to tell customers, when to disclose a breach, and how to explain the impact without giving attackers additional leverage.

4. Monitor leak channels early

Monitor leak sites and underground channels dedicated to your organization’s name, subsidiaries, and brands. Dedicated leak sites are designed to increase coercion and to attract buyers for stolen data. Some groups post teasers to escalate urgency, then expand releases over time.

Decision Framework for Executives

Executives evaluating ransom payment must weigh three factors: operational recovery speed, data exposure risk, and legal compliance. Most organizations that negotiate ultimately refuse to pay if they can restore operations from backups within acceptable timeframes.

• Operational impact and recovery time: Assess revenue loss per day of downtime, disruption to critical services or systems, costs, and customer impact. Weigh the cost of downtime versus ransom + any delay in making the payment.
• Data exposure and leak pressure: Assess what data was stolen, whether it includes regulated categories, and the regulatory and reputational consequences of public disclosure. Keep in mind that attackers may retain or sell your data even if they claim to have deleted it.
• Legal and regulatory constraints: Screen against OFAC’s sanctions prior to considering a payment. Map regulatory reporting obligations and breach notification responsibilities. Review cyber insurance coverage terms and procedures for requesting claim documentation.

According to Verizon’s 2025 Data Breach Investigations Report, 64% of ransomware victims refused to pay in 2024, reflecting improved backup and recovery strategies. Recovery from backups tends to be the primary driver here, as organizations usually do not pay for data exposure if recovery can occur within acceptable timeframes.

Ransomware Negotiation Best Practices and Mistakes To Avoid

Organizations that centralize communication, document every interaction, and verify attacker claims can reduce risks and avoid missteps, such as overpromising or allowing multiple people to engage with threat actors. 

The sections below break this down into practical best practices to follow and common mistakes to avoid when a negotiation becomes unavoidable.

Best practices for ransomware negotiation

• Designate one point of contact. Having only one point of contact avoids confusion with messages and prevents other parties from making unilateral commitments on your behalf.
• Document everything. Every message, every demand, every proof of submission, every claim from the attackers needs to be documented for insurance claims, regulatory filings, and maybe even lawsuits.
• Verify all claims with facts. Keep communications in line with legal and incident response workflows. Capture forensic evidence over the course of the incident.

Group-IB’s solutions for ransomware protection combine threat intelligence, incident response, and digital forensics to help SOC teams detect threats early, validate backup integrity, and accelerate recovery decisions.

Common mistakes to avoid in ransomware negotiation

• Lack of a controlled communication plan. Without a single point of contact, you risk inconsistent messaging, tactical missteps, and conflicting commitments to attackers.
• Overpromising on outcomes. Making commitments you cannot deliver creates legal and operational risk for your organization.
• Treating sanctions screening as purely a compliance task. Screen potential payments against applicable sanctions lists early and treat them as a strategic business decision, not just a finance or legal checkbox.
• Allowing multiple people to contact the attacker. This dilutes your negotiation leverage and sends mixed signals.

Ransomware Readiness Checklist Before You Are Hit

Organizations that invest in ransomware readiness before an attack can contain incidents more quickly and avoid high-risk decisions. 

Below is a checklist to help security, legal, and executive teams assess where they’re prepared, identify gaps, and decide what to prioritize before an attack.

In the white paper  “Ransomware Readiness,” Group-IB experts present a comprehensive framework grounded in industry best practices and insights gained from thousands of incident response cases. In 2023, Group-IB observed a 74% rise in ransomware attacks compared to 2022, with 4,583 incidents reported on dedicated leak sites.

The framework categorizes actions into short-term (0 to 3 months), mid-term (3 to 12 months), and long-term (over 1 year) steps, along with strategic measures to help organizations prioritize their investments and strengthen defenses in an increasingly sophisticated ransomware threat landscape.

Working With Ransomware Negotiation Firms

Organizations facing ransomware attacks may choose to work with specialized negotiation firms to handle communications with attackers. If you engage with a ransomware negotiation firm, embed them with your internal incident response lead or external incident response partner to maintain control and oversight.

Selection criteria

Look for ransomware negotiation firms that offer:

• Integrated with digital forensics, incident response teams, and threat intelligence.
• Secure and controlled communications with the attacker.
• Strong documentation practices.
• Legal and sanctions checks are built into the process. 
• Clear expectations management, negotiation doesn’t equal payment, and outcomes aren’t guaranteed.

Red flags to consider:

• Providers who prioritize negotiation over prevention and recovery fundamentals.
• There is a lack of clarity about their success rates or engagement terms.
• Guaranteed timelines or results. 
• Providers who suggest that payment or even an agreement in principle be made before verification.

How Group-IB Helps Organizations With Ransomware Negotiation and Response

Ransomware negotiation can help organizations buy time, reduce uncertainty, and make more informed decisions based on clearer intelligence. When negotiation is backed by an effective ransomware readiness program, SOC and incident response teams can validate claims more quickly and avoid purely reactive responses. 

In recent ransomware incidents across regulated industries and critical sectors, Group-IB Incident Response teams have sat alongside internal stakeholders during negotiations and coordinated the wider incident response. Our experts provide rapid containment and recovery support, along with executive-ready reporting that keeps leadership aligned on impact, options, and next steps. 

Behind the scenes, the Group-IB Threat Intelligence platform provides up-to-date information on active ransomware groups and their tactics, helping teams quickly narrow down likely attackers and understand how these groups typically operate. Combined with Digital Forensics, this supports efforts to confirm what attackers did and whether their claims are true.

Additionally, 24/7 monitoring via Digital Risk Protection covers external sources, including leak sites, paste sites, dark web forums, and other criminal infrastructure. Instead of learning about a leak from the media or customers, your SOC team will be able to see early signs that stolen data is being published, traded, or used to exert additional extortion pressure.

Talk to Group-IB experts today to assess your current readiness or close specific gaps before an attack.